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Abstract 
China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) aims to achieve a national carbon intensity reduction of 
17% through differentiated targets at the provincial level. Allocating the national target among 
China’s provinces is complicated by the fact that more than half of China’s national carbon emissions 
are embodied in interprovincial trade, with the relatively developed eastern provinces relying on the 
central and western provinces for energy-intensive imports. This study develops a consistent 
methodology to adjust regional emissions-intensity targets for trade-related emissions transfers and 
assesses its economic effects on China's provinces using a regional computable general equilibrium 
model of the Chinese economy. This study finds that in 2007 China's eastern provinces outsource 14% 
of their territorial emissions to the central and western provinces. Adjusting the provincial targets for 
those emissions transfers increases the reduction burden for the eastern provinces by 60%, while 
alleviating the burden for the central and western provinces by 50% each. The CGE analysis 
indicates that this adjustment could double China's national welfare loss compared to the 
homogenous and politics-based distribution of reduction targets. A shared-responsibility approach 
that balances production-based and consumption-based emissions responsibilities is found to 
alleviate those unbalancing effects and lead to a more equal distribution of economic burden among 
China's provinces. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Reducing the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) linked to climate change 
is a major challenge for international environmental policy. China surpassed the United States in 
2007 to become the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2) (IEA, 2007) and has faced 
increasing international pressure to adopt stringent emissions-reduction commitments. In 
international negotiations China has pledged to reduce its carbon intensity, i.e. CO2 emissions 
per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 40% to 45% from 2005 levels by 2020.
1
 China’s 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan (FYP) for economic and social development (2011 to 2015) has 
integrated part of this commitment into binding national policy, targeting a 17% decrease in 
national carbon intensity over the same period (State Council of China, 2012).
2
 
How to assign responsibility for the cost and actions required to reduce emissions without 
undermining economic growth and development goals is a major current policy question in 
China. Within China pronounced differences exist between the developed eastern-coastal 
provinces and the less developed central and western provinces (Keidel, 2007; Feng et al., 2009). 
For example, the per capita GDP between the coastal municipality of Shanghai and the 
southwest province of Guizhou differs by a factor of ten (National Statistics Bureau of China, 
2008). On aggregate, the per capita GDP in the inland regions is less than half of that in the 
coastal regions (Fan et al., 2011). Those disparities lead to large differences in regional CO2 
emissions and emissions intensities, with the eastern-coastal provinces having relatively higher 
emissions but lower emissions intensities than the central and western provinces (Meng et al., 
2011; Feng et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2012). 
Interprovincial trade contributes to China's uneven regional distribution of production and 
consumption activities and their associated emissions. CO2 emissions embodied in 
interprovincial trade have accounted for as much as 64% of China's total CO2 emissions in 2002 
(Guo et al., 2012). On net, emissions transfers occur from the eastern-coastal provinces to the 
central and western provinces (Liang et al., 2007; Guo et al., 2012; Meng et al., 2011). Thus, the 
eastern-coastal provinces outsource part of their emissions by importing energy-intensive and 
energy-related goods, without being held accountable for the emissions embodied in those 
imports (Guo et al., 2012). In turn, the central and western provinces experience a greater burden 
as they increase their emissions to produce for interregional export.  
                                                 
1
 This commitment was made at the 15
th
 Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen in December 2009. 
2
 Prior to the Twelfth FYP, the Eleventh FYP and its predecessors focused on energy intensity (and did not set a 
target for carbon intensity). The Eleventh FYP included a target to reduce energy intensity by 20% nationwide. 
The target was not formally allocated to provinces but comprised of pledges made by each province (World 
Bank, 2009). 
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Previous experience with regional energy intensity targets has shown that allocating a national 
target homogenously to each province can further perpetuate regional disparities and incur large 
costs in some provinces.
3
 In part to avoid these concerns the Twelfth FYP differentiated the 
carbon-intensity targets by province based on political negotiations, ranging from 10% carbon-
intensity reductions for some western provinces (Qinghai and Tibet) to 19.5% in the eastern-
coastal province of Guangdong. However, researchers have argued that a more transparent and 
science-based methodology should guide the setting of future energy and carbon targets on the 
provincial level (Ohshita et al., 2011).
4
  
This study contributes to this discussion. First, it develops a methodology for adjusting 
provincial emissions-intensity targets for the interregional emissions transfers that occur between 
China's provinces. In correcting for emissions transfers, this policy implementation highlights the 
magnitude of emissions-intensity reduction that would be necessary if provinces were held 
responsible for the emissions driven by their consumption demand. Second, the study simulates 
the effects of such a target allocation by employing an interregional computable-general-
equilibrium (CGE) model of the Chinese economy, which provides a comprehensive 
representation of regional market interactions through price and income-responsive supply and 
demand responses (see Zhang et al., 2012).  
This study finds that adjusting the provincial targets for interregional emissions transfers 
increases the reduction burden for the eastern provinces by about 60%, while alleviating the 
burden for the central and western provinces by about 50% each. The CGE analysis indicates 
that this adjustment could double China's national welfare loss compared to a homogenous 
distribution of reduction targets. The welfare losses for the eastern provinces increase by a factor 
of four, while providing little relief for the central and western provinces. A shared-responsibility 
approach that balances production-based and consumption-based emissions responsibilities is 
found to alleviate those unbalancing effects and lead to a more equal distribution of economic 
burden among China's provinces.  
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a detailed review of previous academic 
contributions assessing methods for target allocation, emissions transfers, and consumption-
based emissions accounts. Section 3 presents our methodology for deriving trade-adjusted 
emissions-intensity targets. Section 4 outlines the CGE model employed in this study, as well as 
its database and regional aggregation. Section 5 details the consumption-based adjustment of 
China's emissions-intensity targets. It describes the policy scenarios considered, calculates 
interregional emissions transfers within China, and applies the target-adjustment methodology 
for this context. Section 6 contains the CGE model results, comparing the economic effects of a 
                                                 
3
 A near-homogenous  setting of energy (instead of carbon) intensity targets in the Eleventh FYP (by collecting and 
renegotiating provincial pledges) had pushed some provinces to adopt extreme short-term measures, such as 
rolling blackouts, to fulfill their target. 
4
 See also, e.g., http://www.chinafaqs.org/blog-posts/targets-provinces-energy-intensity-12th-five-year-plan 
[accessed 10/23/2012] and http://blogs.worldwatch.org/can-china-do-a-better-job-delegating-its-2015-energy-
and-emissions-targets/ [accessed 10/23/2012]. 
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consumption-based adjustment of emissions-intensity targets (accounting for trade-related 
emissions transfers) with those following a shared-responsibility approach, a production-based 
approach with uniform targets for each province, and the current politically negotiated targets.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study is related to two strands of literature. Studies in the first strand develop indices for 
informing the regional allocation of emissions targets, while studies in the second strand 
construct consumption-based emissions inventories for highlighting the flows and distributional 
implications of the emissions embodied in trade. The following reviews the studies most relevant 
to this one, highlights the gaps in the literature, and indicates this study's contribution. 
2.1 Previous Approaches for Target Allocation 
Previous analyses have proposed several aggregate indices for informing the regional 
allocation of carbon-intensity reduction targets in China. For example, Wei et al. (2011) have 
constructed an abatement capacity index based on weighted equity and efficiency indices. Based 
on time series data from 1995–2007, the equity index includes per capita CO2 emissions and per 
capita GDP, while the efficiency index includes regional emissions intensity and marginal-
abatement costs. Yi et al. (2011) have constructed an aggregate index for informing the carbon 
intensity allocation in 2020. Their index is based on per capita GDP (to indicate the capacity for 
emissions reduction), accumulated fossil-fuel related CO2 emissions (to indicate the 
responsibility for emissions reduction), and energy consumption per unit of industrial value 
added (to indicate the potential for emissions reduction). Finally, Ohshita et al. (2011) combine 
top-down national target projections and bottom-up provincial and sectoral projections to suggest 
an allocation among Chinese provinces for the national target of 20% energy intensity 
improvements during the Twelfth FYP. 
2.2 Interregional Emissions Transfers 
While the target allocation methods described above aim to address equity issues by including 
per capita indices of emissions and GDP, they do not account for the potential impact that 
interregional trade can have on the stringency and distributional aspects of regional emissions 
targets. Studies on the international level have found that trade can make compliance with 
emissions-reduction targets easier for regions that import emissions-intensive products without 
producing them and harder for those regions that are exporting such products (Wyckoff and 
Roop, 1994; Munksgaard and Pedersen, 2001). Industrialized countries, in particular, have been 
found to be net importers of emissions embodied in trade, while developing countries are found 
to be net exporters (Peters and Hertwich, 2008). With respect to China, Davis and Caldeira (2010) 
have estimated that 22.5% of the emissions produced in China in 2004 were exported, on net, to 
consumers elsewhere, primarily to those in developed countries (see also Shui and Harriss, 2006; 
Wang and Watson, 2008; Lin and Sun, 2010). 
The issue of emissions transfers is mirrored and amplified on the regional level due to China's 
uneven regional distribution of production and consumption activities. CO2 emissions embodied 
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in interprovincial trade in 2002 have exceeded those embodied in China's international exports 
by a factor of three (Guo et al., 2012). On net, emissions transfers occur from the eastern-coastal 
provinces to the central and western provinces (Liang et al., 2007; Guo et al., 2012; Meng et al., 
2011), primarily through the trade in energy-intensive products, such as steel, but also through 
energy transfers as most coal resources are located in the western and central provinces. Thus, 
the eastern-coastal provinces outsource part of their emissions by importing energy-intensive and 
energy-related goods, without being held accountable for the emissions embodied in those 
imports. In turn, the central and western provinces experience a greater burden as they increase 
their emissions to produce for interregional export. The interregional emissions transfers 
therefore distort the regional allocation of China's emissions-intensity target and make it less 
equitable by failing to account for emissions on a consumption basis. 
2.3 Consumption-Based Emissions Allocation 
Consumption-based emissions inventories have been proposed to account for the trade-
induced separation of production from consumption and the associated distributional 
consequences of emissions transfers (Peters and Hertwich, 2008). A consumption-based 
inventory includes the emissions embodied in imports and subtracts those embodied in exports 
(Munksgaard and Pedersen, 2001; Munksgaard et al., 2005). Compared to the polluter-pays 
principle of the production-based approach, it stresses the emissions responsibility of the 
beneficiary, i.e. the consumer of the good, for the emissions generated in the production process. 
For the Chinese context, Guo et al. (2012) have constructed a consumption-based emissions 
inventory for China's provinces and calculated consumption-based regional emissions 
intensities.
5
   
However, while consumption-based emissions inventories have been used regularly as lens to 
study the distributional consequences of emissions transfers (see, e.g., Wiedmann et al., 2007), 
there is little research on how to integrate a consumption-based approach in policy-making and 
what the potential impacts would be. In the literature on international climate policy design, the 
main problem of consumption-based approaches is that they extend the reach of climate policies 
across regional borders, which makes them incompatible with regional sovereignty. This study 
addresses this problem by deriving trade-adjusted emissions-intensity targets that can be 
implemented without violating regional sovereignty. Instead they only require agreement on the 
target allocation. In correcting for emissions transfers, trade-adjusted emissions-intensity targets 
highlight the magnitude of emissions-intensity reduction that would be necessary if provinces 
were held responsible for the emissions driven by their consumption demand. 
                                                 
5
 Their results indicate higher emissions intensities for the emissions-exporting eastern-coastal provinces and lower 
emissions intensities for the emissions-importing central and western provinces. The analysis is based on data 
from the year 2002. As a part of this study, we recalculate the emissions embodied in China's interregional trade 
using an updated data set for the year 2007. 
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A potential problem of adjusting emissions reduction targets is that the adjusted targets may 
highly overburden emissions exporting regions as their targets would become significantly more 
stringent. We therefore also consider a shared-responsibility approach to emissions accounting in 
this study and compare its economic and distributional impacts with those following from purely 
consumption-based and production-based approaches. It has frequently been argued that both the 
consumption-based and the production-based conceptions of responsibility represent extreme 
views and that a shared-responsibility approach may be an appropriate solution to address the 
distributional impacts of emissions generation and economic activity (Bastianoni et al., 2004; 
Gallego and Lenzen, 2005; Lenzen et al., 2007).
6
 
3. TRADE-ADJUSTING EMISSIONS-INTENSITY TARGETS 
In this section, we derive trade-adjusted emissions-intensity targets which are based on a 
consumption-based and shared-responsibility approach, but which can be implemented in a 
production-based system to account for interregional emissions transfers. Due to our application 
to China, we concentrate on emissions-intensity targets. However, the derivations can be easily 
adopted to also adjust absolute emissions targets for consumption responsibilities. 
3.1 Production-Based Emissions Intensities 
In a production-based system, a region's emissions intensity (   
  ) is defined as the ratio of 
territorial emissions (  
   ) to a unit of economic activity, usually taken to be GDP: 
   
    
  
   
    
 (1) 
Mandates for reductions in emissions intensity are commonly expressed as percentage 
reductions of baseline emissions intensities (     
    . The corresponding absolute emissions-
intensity targets are obtained by subtracting the share of percentage emissions-intensity 
reductions from the baseline emissions intensities:  
      
    (       
   )   
    (2) 
The total emissions-intensity target (   
   ) is given by the GDP-weighted average of the 
regional emissions-intensity targets: 
   
    
∑      
        
∑      
 
∑ (       
   )  
   
 
   
 (3) 
where     denotes total GDP summed over all regions. 
                                                 
6
 For example, the consumer of a good gains from its consumption, while the producer gains from its production and 
sale. Similarly on the regional level, standard trade theory knows many cases in which each trading partner 
gains. Producing for export raises one region's GDP, while importing products increases the varieties on offer 
and may reduce prices for consumers who then increase consumption. 
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3.2 Consumption-Based Emissions Intensities 
Consumption-based emissions inventories add to production-based emissions those emissions 
that are embodied in imports (  
  ), but subtract those emissions that are embodied in exports 
(  
  ): 
  
      
      
     
     
       (4)  
where        
     
    denotes the balance of emissions embodied in trade (see, e.g., Peters 
and Hertwich, 2008), also referred to as emissions transfer (Peters et al., 2011). 
Consumption-based emissions intensities (   
   ) can be calculated by adding the ratio of 
emissions transfers to GDP to the production-based emissions intensities: 
   
    
  
      
    
 (5) 
Regions which are net importers of embodied emissions (with positive   )  have higher 
emissions intensities under the consumption-based approach, while the emissions intensities  of 
net exporting regions (with negative   )  are lower compared to those in the production-based 
approach.  
3.3 Trade-Adjusted Emissions-Intensity Targets 
The study's objective is to account for consumption responsibilities in a production-based 
system. We therefore calculate adjusted emissions-intensity reduction targets, while continuing 
to use the production-based emissions intensities as baselines. There are several ways of 
adjusting the production-based emissions-intensity targets to account for consumption 
responsibilities. However, not all possibilities conserve the total emissions-intensity target 
defined in the production-based approach.
7
 A consistent method is to subtract the ratio of 
emissions transfers to GDP from the production-based emissions-intensity targets: 
     
    (       
   )   
    
  
    
 (6) 
The intuition is that regions which are net importers of embodied emissions (i.e. with positive 
  ) have to bear stricter (i.e. lower) emissions-intensity targets, while the emissions-intensity 
targets of net exporters of embodied emissions are relaxed.  
The associated percentage emissions-intensity reductions that would need to be applied to the 
production-based emissions-intensity baseline can be obtained by bringing the consumption-
                                                 
7
 For example, one could argue that the emissions-intensity targets should not be adjusted by all of a region's 
emissions transfers, but only by some proportion (e.g., by the regional percentage emissions-reduction target 
     
   , such that      
     (       
   )   
         
     
    
). Similarly, one could argue that emissions transfers 
should be normalized by the GDP of the emissions-exporting regions (     
     (       
   )   
    ∑
    
    
 ). 
While those approaches might have some intuitive appeal, they do not preserve the total emissions-intensity 
target as, unlike in Eq. (8), the adjustments to the production-based emissions-intensity targets do not sum to 
zero.  
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based emissions-intensity target into the form:      
    (       
   )   
   
. This yields the trade-
adjusted percentage emissions-intensity reductions as: 
     
         
    
  
           
      
    
  
     
 (7) 
Regions with net imports of embodied emissions would be subjected to greater percentage 
emissions-intensity reductions, while the reductions of regions which are net exporters of 
embodied emissions would be lowered. 
The method for adjusting regional EI-targets for emissions transfers as described above 
preserves the total emissions-intensity target given by the GDP-weighted average of the regional 
emissions-intensity targets: 
   
    
∑      
        
∑      
 
∑ (       
   )  
    ∑     
   
    
    (8) 
where it was used that the sum of all emissions transfers is zero, since one country's imports is 
another country's exports: ∑    ∑   
   ∑   
       .
8
  
In our application, applying a consumption-based approach to regulate emissions-intensity 
reductions of Chinese provinces results in emissions-intensity targets that would allow some 
provinces to increase their emissions. Since this would set incentives inconsistent with the 
overall reduction goal, we set the targets of those provinces to their baseline levels. We 
redistribute the spare allowances created to keep the total emissions-intensity target fixed.  
The total absolute emissions allowances to be redistributed are given by: 
     ∑      
         
    
 
     ∑(     
         
   )  
 
  ∑     
     
 
 (9) 
where the adjusted (new) emissions-intensity targets are set to baseline levels, i.e.      
     .9 
Redistributing the emissions allowances among the remaining regions (    ) in proportion to 
their GDP yields adjusted emissions-intensity targets for those regions, and bringing the adjusted 
emission-intensity targets into the form      
    (       
   )   
    yields the adjusted emissions 
reductions: 
     
    (       
   )   
    
    
        
 (10) 
                                                 
8
 While the total emissions-intensity target is conserved in the static framework described above, it should be noted 
that the resulting emissions intensities may differ from the target due to changes in GDP. However, sensitivity 
analyses conducted for this study indicate that the deviations from the total emissions-intensity target amount to 
less than 0.4% percentage points (2.5%) for the model scenarios considered. 
9
 The total emissions to be redistributed,      , are positive because      
    are negative reductions (i.e. increases) in 
the provinces whose emissions-reduction targets are to be adjusted. 
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 (11) 
 Thus, redistributing the spare allowances of those regions which would otherwise increase 
their emissions intensities relaxes the reduction targets of the remaining regions in (inverse) 
proportion to the remaining regions' emissions. 
3.4 Shared Responsibility for Emission-Intensity Reductions 
The production-based accounting system stresses the emissions responsibility of the producer, 
while the consumption-based system stresses that of the consumer. In the following, we derive a 
shared-responsibility approach to target allocation that balances the production-based approach 
and the consumption-based approach. 
Allocating shared responsibilities along a good's value chain is sensitive to sectoral 
aggregation (Lenzen et al., 2007). However, two accounting principles with the same total 
emissions-intensity target can be readily combined. We therefore define the shared emissions-
intensity target as a proportional split between the production-based intensity target and the 
consumption-based one: 
     
    
 
 
     
    
 
 
     
    (12) 
The associated percentage reductions can be obtained by calculating      
    with the equation 
above, imposing the standard form      
    (       
   )   
   
, and solving for      
   : 
     
    
 
 
      
         
     (13) 
Thus, the percentage reduction targets under shared responsibility are given by a simple average 
between production-based and consumption-based reduction targets. 
While there are several ways of accounting for shared responsibility between consumers and 
producers for allocating emissions-reduction burden
10
, the benefit of the method outlined above 
is that it illustrates how two potentially independent indicators for emissions-intensity reductions 
can be combined. In particular Equation 12 can be generalized to combine different indicators 
which inform emissions-intensity targets into an aggregate reduction index. Indicators other than 
the emissions-based ones used in this study may include economic ones, such as per capita GDP, 
or temporal ones, such as historical emissions (Yi et al., 2011; Wei et al., 2011). The general 
form of a composite indicator is then: 
     
    
 
    
∑     
             
    
 
 
    
 ∑     
 
 
  (14) 
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 For example, one could define shared-responsibility emission-intensity target by trade-adjusting the production-
based target by half of a region's emissions transfers, i.e.      
    (       
   )   
    
 
 
  
    
   . This method also 
leads to a consistent allocation of emissions-reduction burden in that is preserved by the total emissions-intensity 
target. 
 10 
where      denotes the number of indicators to be aggregated. 
4. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
This study utilizes an energy-economic model with regional detail for the Chinese economy. 
A detailed model description is provided by Zhang et al. (2012). In short, the model is a 
computable general equilibrium model based on optimizing behavior of economic agents. 
Consumers maximize welfare subject to budget constraints and producers combine intermediate 
inputs and primary factors at least cost to produce output. Energy resources are included as 
primary factors whose use is associated with the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2). The model is 
formulated as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) (Mathiesen, 1985; Rutherford, 1995) in 
which zero-profit and market-clearance conditions determine activity levels and prices.
11
 
4.1 Model Structure 
The production of energy and other goods is described by nested constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) production functions which specify the input composition and substitution 
possibilities between inputs (see Figure 1). Inputs into production include labor, capital, natural 
resources (coal, natural gas, crude oil, and land), and intermediate inputs. For all non-energy 
goods, the CES production functions are arranged in four levels. The top-level nest combines an 
aggregate of capital, labor, and energy inputs (KLE) with material inputs (M); the second-level 
nest combines energy inputs (E) with a value-added composite of capital and labor inputs (VA) 
in the KLE-nest; the third-level nest captures the substitution possibilities between electricity 
(ELE) and final-energy inputs (FE) composed, in the fourth-level nest, of coal (COL), natural gas 
(GAS), gas manufacture and distribution (GDT), crude oil (CRU), and refined oil products 
(OIL). 
 
Figure 1. Nesting structure of CES production functions for non-energy goods. 
The production of energy goods is separated into fossil fuels, oil refining and gas 
manufacture and distribution, and electricity production. The production of fossil fuels (COL, 
                                                 
11
 The model is formulated in the mathematical programming system MPSGE (Rutherford, 1999), a subsystem of 
GAMS, and solved by using PATH (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995).  
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GAS, CRU) combines sector-specific fossil-fuel resources with a Leontief (fixed-proportion) 
aggregate of intermediate inputs and a composite of primary factors and energy, described by a 
Cobb-Douglas function of energy inputs, capital, and labor. Oil refining (OIL) and gas 
manufacture and distribution (GDT) are described similarly to the production of other goods, but 
with a first-level Cobb-Douglas nest combining the associated fossil-fuel inputs (crude oil for oil 
refining; and coal, crude oil, and natural gas for gas manufacture and distribution) with material 
inputs and the capital-labor-energy (KLE) nest. Electricity production is described by a Leontief 
nest which combines, in fixed proportions, several generation technologies, including nuclear, 
hydro, and wind power, as well as conventional power generation based on fossil fuels. Non-
fossil-fuel generation is described by a CES nest combining specific resources and a capital-
labor aggregate.    
All industries are characterized by constant returns to scale and are traded in perfectly 
competitive markets. Capital mobility is represented in each sector by following a putty-clay 
approach in which a fraction of previously installed capital becomes non-malleable in each 
sector. The rest of the capital remains mobile and can be shifted to other sectors in response to 
price changes. The modeling of international trade follows the Armington (1969) approach of 
differentiating goods by country of origin. Thus, goods within a sector and region are represented 
as a CES aggregate of domestic goods and imported ones with associated transport services. 
Goods produced within China are assumed to be closer substitutes than goods from international 
sources to replicate a border effect.  
Final consumption in each region is determined by a representative agent who maximizes 
consumptions subject to its budget constraint. Consumption is represented as a CES aggregate of 
non-energy goods and energy inputs and the budget constraint is determined by factor and tax 
incomes with fixed investment and public expenditure. 
4.2 Database and Aggregation 
The model is calibrated to a comprehensive energy-economic data set which includes a 
consistent representation of energy markets in physical units, as well as detailed economic 
accounts for the year 2007. The data set is global, but includes regional detail for China's 
provinces. The global data comes from the database version 8 of the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP). The GTAP 8 data set provides consistent global accounts of production, 
consumption and bilateral trade as well as consistent accounts of physical energy ﬂows, energy 
prices and emissions in the year 2007, and identiﬁes 129 countries and regions and 57 
commodities (Narayanan et al., 2012). Since in this study, we are primarily interested in the 
economic and distributional effects among Chinese provinces, we aggregate the international 
data into three international regions (U.S., Europe, and the rest of the world) to capture the 
international market impacts of distributional changes within China. With respect to 
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commodities, we include six energy sectors and 10 non-energy composites.12  
The data for China is based on China’s national input-output table and the full set of China’s 
provincial input-output tables published in 2007 (National Information Center of China, 2011). 
The provincial input-output data for China speciﬁes benchmark economic accounts for 30 
provinces in China (Tibet is not included due to a lack of data and the small scale of its economic 
activities). Energy use and emissions data is based on the 2007 China Energy Statistical 
Yearbook (National Statistics Bureau of China, 2008). Zhang et al. (2012) describe in detail the 
method used for balancing the Chinese data set and combining it with the international one. 
Elasticities of substitution are adopted from the GTAP 8 database, as well as from the MIT 
Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model (Paltsev et al., 2005), in particular for 
the price elasticities of supply of nuclear, hydro, and wind. Table A1 in the appendix provides an 
overview of the elasticities used in this study. 
 
Figure 2. Overview of Chinese provinces included in the analysis. 
The eastern provinces include Beijing (BEJ), Fujian (FUJ), Guandong (GUD), Hainan (HAI), Hebei 
(HEB), Jiangsu (JSU), Liaoning (LIA), Shandong (SHD), Shanghai (SHH), Tianjin (TAJ), and 
Zhejiang (ZHJ); the central provinces include Anhui (ANH), Heilongjiang (HLJ), Henan (HEN), 
Hunan (HUN), Hubei (HUB), Jiangxi (JXI), Jilin (JIL), Neimenggu (NMG), and Shanxi (SHX); the 
western provinces include Chongqing (CHQ), Gansu (GAN), Guangxi (GXI), Guizhou (GZH), 
Ningxia (NXA), Qinghai (QIH), Shaanxi (SHA), Sichuan (SIC), Xinjiang (XIN), and Yunnan 
(YUN). 
Figure 2 shows the provinces included in the analysis. We explicitly simulate the policy 
scenarios' effects for all 30 Chinese provinces for which data is available. To ease the 
presentation of results, we group those provinces according to the three economic zones defined 
                                                 
12
 The energy goods include coal (COL), crude oil (CRU), refined-oil products (OIL), natural gas (GAS), gas 
manufacture and distribution (GDT), and electricity (ELE); the non-energy sectors include agriculture (AGR), 
minerals mining (OMN), light industries (LID), energy-intensive industries (EID), transport equipment (TME), 
other manufacturing industries (OID), water (WTR), trade (TRD), transport (TRP), and other service industry 
(OTH). 
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in China's Seventh FYP (State Council of China, 1986; Feng et al., 2012), i.e. into eastern, 
central, and western zones. The eastern provinces are the economically most developed regions 
with high levels of industrialization and rapid growth in international trade in recent decades. 
Based on the Chinese database, Table 1 indicates that the eastern provinces' total GDP is more 
than double that of the central provinces and more than four times that of western provinces. 
They are also the greatest emitters of CO2 in China. However, due to their more advanced 
economic development they have the lowest emissions intensity. The central provinces have 
well-established infrastructures and abundant natural resources, such as coal, oil, and metal ores. 
They are relatively less developed compared to the eastern provinces, although provinces, such 
as Inner Mongolia (Neimenggu) are industrializing rapidly. The central provinces' total emissions 
are more than 30% lower than those of the eastern provinces, but their emissions intensity is 65% 
higher. The western provinces are the least developed ones, but provinces such as Xinjiang have 
abundant oil and natural-gas reserves. The western provinces' total emissions are more than 50% 
lower than those in the eastern provinces, but their emissions intensity is almost double (Table 
1). 
Table 1. Regional emissions, GDP, and emissions intensities.  
Region Emissions 
(MTCO2) 
GDP 
(billion US$) 
Emissions intensity 
(MtCO2/billion US$) 
Eastern 2639 2278 1.16 
Central 1801 943 1.91 
Western 1224 542 2.26 
China 5664 3763 1.51 
5. CONSUMPTION-BASED EMISSIONS-INTENSITY TARGETS FOR CHINA'S 
PROVINCES 
This section applies the general methodology for adjusting emissions-intensity targets for 
emissions transfers to the Chinese context. It lays out the model scenarios considered, computes 
interregional emissions transfers, and derives adjusted emissions-intensity targets for China's 
provinces. 
5.1 Model Scenarios 
This study considers four model scenarios to evaluate the economic and distributional effects 
of implementing consumption-based emissions-intensity targets for China's provinces. The 
scenarios considered differ with respect to their method of allocating the emissions-intensity 
targets. The production-based (PRD) scenario follows a territorial and production-based 
accounting principle and allocates the same percentage emissions-intensity target to each 
province; the politics-based (POL) scenario follows the political decision-making process and 
adopts the emissions-intensity allocation that was politically negotiated for the Twelfth FYP; the 
consumption-based (CON) scenario follows a consumption-based accounting principle and 
adjusts emissions-intensity targets for interregional emissions transfers; lastly, the shared-
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responsibility (SHR) scenario takes a median approach in which emissions responsibilities and 
intensity targets are equally divided between the production-based principle and the 
consumption-based one. Each scenario targets an emissions-intensity reduction of 17.4% 
nationally, which is in line with the target adopted by the Chinese government in its Twelfth 
FYP.13  
5.2 Interregional Emissions Transfers 
For obtaining the interregional emissions transfers we apply a recursive diagonalization 
algorithm as described in Böhringer et al. (2011).14 Figure 3 provides an overview of China's 
interregional emissions transfers as calculated in this study. On net, the eastern provinces import 
about 350 MtCO2 of embodied emissions, i.e. 14% of their territorial emissions. Sixty percent of 
those emissions (212 MtCO2) are embodied in imports from the central provinces and 40% (136 
MtCO2) in imports from the western provinces. The percentage emissions transfers for individual 
regions can be much larger than the average. For example, the eastern provinces of Zhejiang, 
Hainan, and Beijing each import embodied emissions which amount to more than 70% of their 
territorial emissions. On the other hand, the central province of Inner Mongolia (Neimenggu) and 
the western province of Guizhou each export embodied emissions which amount to more than 
40% of their territorial emissions. 
                                                 
13
 Although we adopt the emissions-intensity target of the 12
th
 FYP, we do not aim to simulate its future economic 
impacts. Instead our objective is to gain insights into the relative economic and distributional impacts of different 
approaches for allocating emissions-intensity targets. To better isolate the effects relevant for this analysis, we 
use a static (instead of a dynamic) CGE framework based on data representing economic conditions for the year 
2007. 
14
 Böhringer et al. (2011) build a multiregional input-output model based on the GTAP data base and calculate the 
emissions embodied in international trade. We apply the same method to calculate the emissions embodied in 
interregional trade in China. We refer to Böhringer et al. (2011) for a detailed description of the general 
methodology.  
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Figure 3. Emissions transfers between China's provinces. Positive numbers indicate a 
greater share of emissions embodied in imports than those embodied in exports (see 
Eq.4).  
5.3 Consumption-Based Emissions-Intensity Targets 
Adjusting the regional emissions-intensity targets on a consumption basis leads to a greater 
reduction burden for the eastern provinces and less burden for the central and western provinces. 
Table 2 lists the trade-adjusted emissions-intensity reduction targets which were obtained by 
applying the methodology outlined in Section 2, in particular Equations 7, 13, and 15. The 
reduction burden for the eastern provinces in the consumption-based (CAP) scenario increases 
by 10.4 percentage points (60%) compared to the production-based (PAP) scenario with 
homogenous reduction targets. At the same time, the reduction burden for the central and western 
provinces is reduced by 10 and 8 percentage points (55% and 49%) respectively. In comparison, 
the politics-based (POL) scenario is associated with a much milder redistribution of reduction 
burden. In that scenario, the eastern provinces' reduction targets are increased by a mere 1.2 
percentage points (7%) compared to the PAP scenario, while the central and western provinces' 
reduction targets are decreased by 0.6 and 1.7 percentage points (4% and 10%) respectively. 
Lastly, the shared-responsibility (SHR) scenario yields emission-intensity reduction targets that 
are given by the average between the production-based and the consumption-based targets. Thus, 
the eastern provinces' reduction burden increases by 5 percentage points (30%) compared to the 
production-based scenario, while the burden of the central and western provinces decreases by 5 
and 4 percentage points (27% and 24%) respectively. 
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Table 2. Regional emissions-intensity reduction targets in the production-based (PRD), 
politics-based (POL), consumption-based (CON), and shared-responsibility-based allocation 
(SHR) scenarios (in percentage term). 
Region PRD POL CON SHR 
Eastern 17.4 18.6 27.8 22.6 
Central 17.4 16.8 7.9 12.6 
Western 17.4 15.7 9.0 13.2 
China 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4 
Paralleling emissions transfers, the trade-adjusted emissions-intensity targets show a larger 
spread than the averages suggest. Especially the heavily importing eastern provinces of Zhejiang, 
Hainan, and Beijing are burdened greatly when following a consumption-based approach for 
target allocation. Their targets for emissions-intensity reductions increase from 17.4% to over 
85%. On the other hand, the reduction targets for several emissions-exporting central and 
western provinces, such as Inner Mongolia and Shanxi (central), and Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, 
and Yunnan (western) become zero in the consumption-based approach.15  
As Figure 3 indicates those regional boundaries do not map exactly to net emissions-exporting 
and emissions-importing provinces. Among the net emissions-importing provinces are nine 
eastern provinces, four central, and three western ones; among the net emissions-exporting 
provinces are seven western provinces, five central, and two eastern ones. The heterogeneous 
composition of those two groups decreases the maximum and minimum values in the regional 
aggregates used for reporting, which should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. The 
maximum and minimum economic impacts are mentioned in the results section wherever 
feasible to underline this distinction and the appendix provides a detailed overview of the 
economic impacts for each province. 
6. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONSUMPTION-BASED TARGET ADJUSTMENTS 
This section applies the CGE model described in Section 4 to analyze the economic effects of 
adopting the different target-allocation methods described above. Implementing consumption-
based and regionally differentiated emissions-intensity targets in China can be expected to lead 
to significant differences in economic and distributional impacts between China's provinces, 
especially when considering the large spread of reduction targets listed in Table 2. To capture 
those impacts sufficiently, we separately discuss the regional, provincial, and sectoral impacts. 
6.1 Impacts on the Regional Level 
This study assesses macroeconomic welfare effects in terms of Hicksian equivalent variation 
                                                 
15
 The emissions-intensity reduction targets of those provinces would actually become negative, i.e. allow for 
increases in emissions intensity. However, because we want to preserve incentives for not increasing emissions 
intensities on the provincial level, we constrain the maximum alleviation for emissions exporting provinces to be 
the homogenous reduction target of the production-based approach, i.e. 17.4%. The provinces that would exceed 
this alleviation are allocated their baseline emissions intensities, i.e. a 0% reduction target. 
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of income. The scenarios' effects on regional welfare are listed in Table 3 (top panel). The 
production-based scenario which implements homogenous emissions-intensity reductions of 
17.4% for each province leads to the greatest welfare losses in the central provinces (-2.26%) 
relative to the no-policy case. The decreases in welfare are about a third less in the western 
provinces (-1.5%) and another third less in the eastern provinces (-0.87%) who are the least 
burdened. The politics-based scenario changes those trends only marginally. The eastern 
provinces' welfare decreases by 0.1 percentage points more than in the production-based 
scenario, with little alleviation of negative welfare impacts for the central and western provinces. 
Table 3. Regional changes in welfare as measured by equivalent variation of income (top) 
and regional changes in GDP (bottom). 
EV (%) PRD POL CON SHR 
Eastern -0.87 -0.96 -3.64 -1.20 
Central -2.26 -2.23 -1.90 -2.00 
Western -1.50 -1.44 -1.79 -1.43 
China -1.36 -1.39 -2.84 -1.46 
GDP (%) PRD POL CON SHR 
Eastern -0.32 -0.35 -1.27 -0.43 
Central -1.05 -1.04 -0.92 -0.94 
Western -0.69 -0.69 -0.85 -0.67 
China -0.56 -0.57 -1.12 -0.59 
The consumption-based scenario increases the reduction burden for the eastern provinces by 
60% and decreases the burden for central and western provinces by about 50% each when 
compared to the production-based scenario listed in Table 2. As a result, the eastern provinces 
become the highest burdened ones among China's regions, experiencing a more than four times 
larger negative welfare impact than in the production-based scenario. The decreases in welfare in 
the east are about two times larger than those of the central and western provinces. While the 
decrease in welfare that central provinces experience is 16% less than in the production-based 
scenario, the welfare loss in the western provinces is 20% larger than in the production-based 
scenario despite the substantial alleviation of reduction burden for those provinces in the 
consumption-based scenario. The national welfare loss more than doubles in the consumption-
based scenario compared to the production-based and politics-based scenarios. 
The shared-responsibility scenario results in a more even distribution of the welfare impacts 
across provinces relative to the consumption-based scenario. The national welfare loss in the 
shared-responsibility scenario is about 7% and 4% larger than in the production-based scenario 
and the politics-based scenario respectively (compared to 109% in the consumption-based 
scenario). Although the eastern provinces are again the least burdened in the shared-
responsibility scenario, the welfare losses for the central and western provinces are both reduced 
compared to the production-based and politics-based scenarios, by 12% and 4% respectively.  
Table 3 (lower panel) lists the changes in GDP for the policy scenarios considered. In 
principle, changes in GDP can differ from changes in equivalent variation as GDP focuses solely 
on the production side of the economy. Although the changes in GDP are less accentuated than 
the changes in EV, they follow the same direction in similar proportions.  
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6.2 Impacts on the Provincial Level 
Individual provinces can bear much greater welfare impacts than the impacts for the aggregate 
regions suggest. Figure 4 highlights the five provinces which are burdened the most and the five 
which are burdened the least under the consumption-based scenario. A complete listing of 
welfare and GDP impacts is provided in Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix. Three of the most 
heavily burdened provinces are in the east (Hainan, Zhejiang, Beijing), while one is in the center 
(Shanxi) and one in the west (Chongqing). With the exception of Shanxi, all of those provinces 
are net importers of embodied emissions and are therefore subjected to greater reduction targets 
in the consumption-based scenario. Shanxi is China's greatest coal producer, possessing about 
one third of China's coal reserves. It is therefore impacted significantly by all policies aimed at 
reducing China's emissions intensity. The welfare losses of the five highest burdened provinces 
cover a large range, spanning percentage welfare changes of -6 to -33% compared to the no-
policy case. Those losses correspond to 2 to 22 times the magnitude of losses found in the 
production-based scenario. 
  
Figure 4. Changes in equivalent variation of income (EV) for the five most-burdened 
provinces and the five least-burdened under a consumption-based adjustment of 
emissions-intensity targets. Regional abbreviations are listed in the footnote to Figure 
1.  
Among the five least burdened provinces in the consumption-based scenario are two western 
provinces (Gansu, Guizhou), two central provinces (Hubei, Henan), and one eastern province 
(Hebei). All of those provinces are net exporters of embodied emissions and therefore are 
subjected to less stringent reduction targets in the consumption-based scenario. Three out of the 
five (Gansu, Guizhou, and Hebei) have a zero reduction target, i.e. they are allowed to keep their 
baseline emissions intensities due to their high exports of embodied emissions. The welfare gains 
range from 1% to 2% compared to the no-policy case, which corresponds to factor increases of 
0.5 to 5 compared to the production-based scenario's welfare levels. Hubei and Guizhou are 
important energy producers, in particular for electricity generation. Those provinces experience 
welfare gains in all policy scenarios as the price for electricity increases following the mandated 
reductions in emissions intensity. 
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6.3 Impacts on the Sectoral Level 
Of specific interest for analyzing the sectoral impacts of policies targeting reductions in 
emissions intensity are the fossil-fuel sectors which produce emissions, and the sectors which are 
direct substitutes or have high emissions inputs, such as the electricity and energy-intensive 
sectors. Table 4 lists the output and price changes in those sectors for the model scenarios 
considered. 
Table 4. Regional changes in output and prices for the coal (COL), electricity (ELE), and 
energy-intensive (EID) sectors. 
Sector Region Output changes (%) Price changes (%) 
PRD POL CON SHR PRD POL CON SHR 
COL Eastern -24.46 -25.23 -28.40 -26.53 -8.16 -8.23 -7.84 -8.25 
Central -11.99 -12.06 -11.38 -12.24 -11.36 -11.39 -11.09 -11.39 
Western -20.15 -19.40 -16.90 -18.67 -8.76 -8.69 -8.03 -8.52 
China -16.80 -16.81 -16.50 -17.00 -10.09 -10.10 -9.70 -10.07 
ELE Eastern -14.91 -16.36 -29.42 -23.73 17.23 18.45 19.78 18.73 
Central -16.21 -15.32 -2.22 -9.20 15.90 15.58 12.15 13.05 
Western -13.06 -11.23 -3.90 -8.44 10.20 9.57 7.78 8.58 
China -14.93 -15.10 -16.90 -16.73 15.50 15.89 14.62 14.88 
EID Eastern -3.79 -4.50 -10.30 -5.53 2.37 2.52 3.03 2.59 
Central -3.76 -3.29 4.07 -1.50 3.05 2.99 2.27 2.52 
Western -7.69 -6.64 0.37 -4.93 3.75 3.55 3.01 3.17 
China -4.33 -4.49 -5.20 -4.43 2.73 2.78 2.82 2.65 
The Chinese primary energy mix is dominated by coal resources, which make up about 70% 
of the mix (NBS China, 2008). Emission-intensity targets induce a substitution away from 
energy-intensive coal to less energy-intensive energy carriers, such as natural gas and renewable 
resources. Table 4 indicates that coal production decreases by about 17% in each policy scenario. 
The price for coal decreases due to a drop in demand by about 10% on aggregate. In accordance 
with the distribution of emissions-intensity targets, the reductions in coal production are higher 
in the eastern provinces (24–28%) than in the central and western ones (11–12% and 17–20% 
respectively). This trend is most accentuated in the consumption-based scenario. The western 
provinces increase their coal production by 3 percentage points (15%) in the consumption-based 
scenario relative to the production-based one, while the eastern provinces decrease their 
production by 4 percentage points (17%).  
The implementation of regional targets for reducing emissions intensity creates an implicit 
price for emissions inputs. This increases the prices for affected commodities, such as electricity 
and energy-intensive goods, which reduces output. Table 4 indicates that the price for electricity 
increases by 15–16% in each policy scenario on aggregate, inducing output reduction of similar 
percentages (15–17%). There are big differences across the scenarios on the provincial level. 
While the percentage output reductions in electricity are relatively evenly distributed in the 
production-based scenario (13–16%), the range widens in the other policy scenarios, in particular 
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in the consumption-based one (2–29%). In the latter the eastern provinces are allocated more 
stringent emissions-intensity reduction targets. As a result, those provinces seek to substitute 
domestic electricity generation which would increase their emissions intensity with electricity 
imports from other provinces. This decreases electricity generation in the eastern provinces (by 
15 percentage points compared to the production-based scenario), but increases generation in the 
central and western provinces (by 14 and 9 percentage points, respectively, compared to the 
production-based scenario). Similar trends can be observed for energy-intensive goods. Prices 
increase by about 3 percentage points in each scenario on aggregate and output decreases by 4–5 
percentage points. Again, the eastern provinces exhibit a decrease of energy-intensive 
production, while the central and western provinces exhibit an increase (of about 8 percentage 
points each). 
Associated with changes in output and prices are changes in trade flows. Figure 5 displays 
China's interregional net trade flows (i.e. exports minus imports) in billion US$. In line with the 
output changes discussed above, coal imports by the eastern provinces decrease by 22% in the 
consumption-based scenario compared to the production-based scenario. At the same time, the 
eastern provinces' electricity and energy-intensive imports increase by 37% and 71% 
respectively. The corresponding exports of the central and western regions increase by 37% and 
41% for electricity, and by 41% and 209% for energy-intensive goods. Thus, implementing 
consumption-based emissions-intensity targets results in significant outsourcing of energy and 
energy-intensive production from the eastern provinces to the central and western ones.  
 
Figure 5. Regional net trade flows (exports minus imports) in billion US$ for the coal 
(COL), electricity (ELE), and energy-intensive (EID) sectors.   
6.4 Feedback on Emissions Transfers 
The outsourcing effect has further repercussions on emissions embodied in trade and 
interprovincial emissions transfers. Figure 6 displays the interregional emissions transfers 
resulting from the policy scenarios considered. In the consumption-based scenario, the net 
emissions transfers outside the eastern provinces increase by about 12 MtCO2 (4%) compared to 
the benchmark. The consumption-based approach to regional target allocation therefore creates 
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incentives which perpetuate the imbalance of consumption-based emissions it seeks to address. 
As a consequence, the regional differences in reduction targets and the economic effects resulting 
from those, such as sectoral specialization and outsourcing, can be expected to increase with 
every iteration of target setting.  
Figure 6 indicates that all other policy scenarios result in a decrease of emissions transfers 
from the eastern provinces to the central and western ones. The decreases amount to 26% and 
23% in the production-based and politics-based scenarios respectively, and to 11% in the shared-
responsibility scenario. The latter indicates that the economic and emissions unbalancing effects 
of the consumption-based approach can be remedied by weighing the consumption-based 
emissions responsibilities with other allocation metrics, such as the production-based 
responsibilities in the shared-responsibility scenario. 
 
Figure 6. Emissions transfers (emissions embodied in imports minus emissions embodied in 
exports) in the policy scenarios considered and the no-policy benchmark (BMK).   
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Estimates of emissions embodied in trade and analyses of the distributional and political 
implications of consumption-based approaches to emissions accounting have been of great 
interest in the last several years. While consumption-based emissions inventories are now 
regularly constructed for various countries and regions in the world, little attention has been 
devoted to the possible methods and potential economic effects of implementing consumption-
based emissions responsibilities into actual policy making. This study addresses those two points 
by developing a consistent methodology for adjusting regional emissions-reduction targets for 
trade-induced emissions transfers. It then simulates the economic effects following from their 
implementation for the context of China's Twelfth FYP and the plan’s allocation of emissions-
intensity reduction targets among its provinces.  
This study finds that in 2007 China's eastern provinces are net importers of emissions 
embodied in interregional trade, while the central and western provinces are net exporters. The 
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magnitude of interregional emissions transfers from the eastern provinces to the central and 
western ones amounts to 14% of the eastern provinces' territorial emissions. Adjusting the 
regional emissions-intensity reduction targets for those emissions transfers increases the 
reduction burden for the eastern provinces by about 60% on aggregate, while alleviating the 
burden for the central and western provinces by 55% and 49%, respectively.  
Our CGE analysis indicates that this redistribution of reduction burden could double China's 
national welfare loss compared both to a homogenous allocation of reduction burden under a 
production-based approach and to the politically-adopted allocation of the Twelfth FYP. The 
results show that the welfare losses for the eastern provinces increase by a factor of four on 
aggregate and up to a factor of 22 for individual provinces. The central provinces' welfare losses 
are only slightly lowered when adopting consumption-based reduction targets, while those of the 
western provinces increase despite their lowered reduction burden.  
The sectoral analysis indicates that the consumption-based allocation of reduction targets 
results in significant outsourcing of energy and energy-intensive production from the eastern 
provinces to the central and western ones. This is found to increase the interregional emissions 
transfers between those regions above benchmark levels. The consumption-based approach to 
regional target allocation as implemented in this study therefore creates incentives which 
perpetuate the imbalance of consumption-based emissions. As a consequence, the regional 
differences in reduction targets and the economic effects resulting from those, such as sectoral 
specialization and outsourcing, can be expected to increase with each iteration of consumption-
based target setting. Those results caution against an approach for allocating emissions-reduction 
burden based solely on consumption-based emissions responsibilities.  
Another caveat of allocating emissions-intensity targets solely by a regional consumption-
based approach is the potential interaction with those emissions that are embodied in 
international (instead of interregional) trade. In 2004, 22.5% of the emissions produced in China 
were embodied in goods that were exported (Davis and Caldeira, 2010). Those export goods, in 
particular labor-intensive textile goods and wearing apparel are primarily produced in the eastern 
provinces, while a smaller portion of energy-intensive exports is produced in the central and 
western provinces (Guo et al., 2012). A comprehensive consumption-based adjustment of 
emissions-intensity targets would need to take into account those international emissions 
transfers, which may raise conflicts with issues of national sovereignty.  
This study has analyzed a shared-responsibility approach to target allocation as a potential 
remedy for the unbalancing effects of the consumption-based approach. The shared-
responsibility approach divides emissions responsibilities between the consumer and the 
producer. It was found that allocating regional reduction targets by following this approach 
largely alleviates the negative effects that an allocation that is solely based on the consumption-
based approach has on national welfare. In particular, the national welfare loss is reduced to 
levels comparable with those under a production-based allocation. Welfare losses for the central 
and western provinces are slightly reduced compared to those of the production-based approach 
and the high welfare losses that the eastern provinces experience in the consumption-based 
 23 
approach decrease markedly. The outsourcing effects are also alleviated, so that emissions 
transfers from the eastern provinces to the central and western ones decrease below benchmark 
levels. The shared-responsibility approach thus demonstrates that integrating consumption-based 
emissions responsibilities with other allocation metrics, such as producer responsibilities, can 
constitute a potential option for future emissions-reduction allocations. The analytical part of this 
study provides the general methodology necessary for deriving a combined index for target 
allocation. 
Another potential policy option for addressing distributional concerns while avoiding the 
unbalancing effects of a consumption-based approach could be an emissions-trading system. 
Zhang et al. (2012) have demonstrated in a general-equilibrium framework for the Chinese 
context that a national emissions-intensity target, together with emissions trading, reduces 
national welfare loss relative to implementing regional targets that do not allow for emissions 
trading. Within an ETS, distributional concerns could potentially be addressed by differentiated 
baseline allocation. While we defer a detailed analysis of this policy option for future research, 
we note that the improvements in measuring emissions that will be needed for a future ETS in 
China (see, e.g., Han et al., 2012) are similarly beneficial for enabling the implementation of the 
different allocation methods analyzed in this study. 
Although the numerical results obtained in this study hold strictly only for the specific 
parameter values and assumptions adopted in our model framework, we have taken steps to 
ensure the model provides a framework suitable for the policy comparison undertaken in this 
study. Importantly, our CGE analysis assumes that China's economy is characterized by perfectly 
competitive markets, something which is easily contestable. Zhang et al. (2012) test the effects 
of market distortions and parameter assumptions on the results obtained with their regional CGE 
model for China. They find that subsidized end-use prices for electricity increase regional 
welfare losses as costs are not passed through. Constraints on capital mobility have been found to 
lead to effects in the same direction, albeit without changing the direction of relative impacts 
between a regional target scenario and a national one with trading. Similar results can be 
expected to hold for this multi-scenario comparison. Nonetheless, additional modeling studies 
and parameter analyses for the Chinese context, in particular of the elasticities of substitution 
which can have significant effects on the supply and demand responses (Sue Wing, 2004; Jacoby 
et al., 2006) are highly encouraged.   
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Reference values of elasticities of substitution in production and consumption. 
Parameter Substitution margin Value 
     Energy (excluding electricity) 1 
       Energy—electricity  0.5 
      Energy/electricity—value-added  0.5 
     Capital—labor  1 
       Capital/labor/energy—materials  0 
      Coal/oil—natural gas/fuel gas in ELE 1 
     Coal—oil in ELE 0.3 
     Gas—fuel gas in ELE 10 
     Resource—Capital/labor/energy/materials in hydro ELE 1 
     Resource—Capital/labor/energy/materials in nuclear ELE 1 
     Resource—Capital/labor/energy/materials in wind ELE 1 
      Resource—Capital—Labor  in AGR and OMN 1 
       Capital/labor/materials—resource in primary energy 0 
     Transportation—Non-transport in private consumption 1 
     Energy—Non-energy in private consumption 0.25 
    Non-energy in private consumption 0.25 
     Energy in private consumption 0.4 
    Leisure—material consumption 1 
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Table A2. Reference values of elasticities of substitution in production and consumption. 
Region PRD POL CON SHR 
ANH -1.21 -1.20 -1.19 -1.14 
BEJ -2.72 -2.80 -10.47 -3.79 
CHQ -2.91 -2.88 -5.94 -3.93 
FUJ 0.09 0.05 -2.21 -0.68 
GAN -0.72 -0.49 1.51 0.47 
GUD -0.46 -0.60 -0.89 -0.46 
GXI 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.25 
GZH 0.79 0.86 1.12 1.10 
HAI -1.49 -1.13 -32.95 -6.55 
HEB -0.43 -0.47 1.60 0.34 
HEN -0.94 -0.88 0.80 -0.32 
HLJ -4.75 -4.54 -4.88 -4.45 
HUB 0.68 0.69 1.09 0.96 
HUN -1.52 -1.50 -1.60 -1.41 
JIL -0.85 -0.85 -1.07 -0.74 
JSU -0.33 -0.47 -1.79 -0.90 
JXI -0.90 -0.91 -1.63 -0.95 
LIA -1.52 -1.60 -0.62 -0.96 
NMG -3.81 -3.66 -1.89 -3.00 
NXA -1.96 -1.91 -3.83 -2.27 
QIH -0.46 0.27 0.20 0.31 
SHA -4.23 -4.26 -4.06 -4.09 
SHD -1.58 -1.69 -1.07 -1.45 
SHH 0.11 0.04 0.25 0.31 
SHX -14.19 -14.44 -15.03 -14.26 
SIC -1.69 -1.77 -1.86 -1.62 
TAJ -2.36 -2.60 -4.85 -2.54 
XIN -3.94 -3.55 -4.85 -3.91 
YUN 0.55 0.57 0.26 0.58 
ZHJ -1.14 -1.20 -16.84 -3.02 
Eastern -0.87 -0.96 -3.64 -1.20 
Central -2.26 -2.23 -1.90 -2.00 
Western -1.50 -1.44 -1.79 -1.43 
China -1.36 -1.39 -2.84 -1.46 
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Table A3. Percentage changes in GDP. 
Region PRD POL CON SHR 
ANH -0.88 -0.87 -0.90 -0.82 
BEJ -0.98 -1.01 -2.81 -1.22 
CHQ -0.96 -0.97 -2.09 -1.25 
FUJ -0.03 -0.04 -0.81 -0.28 
GAN 0.23 0.29 0.76 0.50 
GUD -0.29 -0.35 -0.57 -0.29 
GXI -0.28 -0.26 -0.29 -0.21 
GZH 0.36 0.42 0.86 0.66 
HAI -0.82 -0.69 -12.01 -2.76 
HEB -0.15 -0.16 0.43 0.05 
HEN -0.29 -0.26 0.35 -0.08 
HLJ -1.49 -1.47 -1.76 -1.43 
HUB 0.14 0.14 0.45 0.34 
HUN -0.93 -0.93 -1.00 -0.86 
JIL -0.57 -0.58 -0.76 -0.52 
JSU -0.24 -0.28 -0.76 -0.42 
JXI -0.57 -0.57 -0.80 -0.56 
LIA -0.43 -0.46 -0.18 -0.26 
NMG -1.40 -1.35 -0.52 -1.08 
NXA -0.93 -0.91 -1.51 -0.99 
QIH 1.41 0.71 -0.29 0.59 
SHA -1.79 -1.80 -1.76 -1.74 
SHD -0.29 -0.31 -0.27 -0.25 
SHH -0.16 -0.19 -0.12 -0.07 
SHX -5.36 -5.48 -6.10 -5.59 
SIC -0.86 -0.88 -1.02 -0.83 
TAJ -0.72 -0.78 -1.50 -0.77 
XIN -1.64 -1.51 -1.89 -1.61 
YUN 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.10 
ZHJ -0.38 -0.40 -5.30 -0.92 
Eastern -0.32 -0.35 -1.27 -0.43 
Central -1.05 -1.04 -0.92 -0.94 
Western -0.69 -0.69 -0.85 -0.67 
China -0.56 -0.57 -1.12 -0.59 
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